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Abstract 
This paper investigates the Japanese concept of ma/aida, the space in-between, discussed 
by French author Roland Barthes as the Neutral, not signifying the medium of the opposite 
poles but the bare existence. It first analyzes how the discourse of contiguous relationships 
and the space between others has functioned in modern and postwar Japan, and further 
employs the works of the Japanese female writer Matsuura Rieko as counterexamples, 
with particular emphasis on the space between the sensual and the sexual. It provides a 
fresh view on the conceptions of space and indirectness between and within the body.   
Keywords: space in-between, selfhood, sensual and sexual, passivity, skinship  
Izvleček 
Članek raziskuje japonski koncept ma/aida, med-prostor, ki ga francoski avtor Roland 
Barthes obravnava kot »nevtralni«, in ki ne označuje medij nasprotnih si polov, temveč 
golo eksistenco. Članek najprej analizira, kako je diskurz sosednjih razmerij in časa med 
drugimi deloval v moderni in povojni Japonski ter proučuje japonsko žensko pisateljico 
Matsuura Rieko kot protiprimer s posebnim poudarkom na čas med čutnostjo in 
seksualnostjo. Članek ponudi svež pogled na koncepte prostora in indirektnosti med telesi 
in znotraj telesa. 
Ključne besede: vmesni prostor, individualnost, čuten in seksualen, pasivnost, »intimna 
komunikacija preko dotika« 
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1 Introduction 
“The body is this departure of self to self.” 
––Jean-Luc Nancy 2008 
 
Because your sensation is transmitted very strongly, I think that I can feel you 
naked when you are clothed, and when you are naked, I think that I can touch 
your nerves directly. 
When I am together with you, my threshold of consciousness is low. Small 
things become a joy, a pleasure.  
The I that you know becomes like a shellfish stripped of its shell. Soft, pliant, 
sensitive—a shellfish that has lost its shell. (Matsuura 2006, 203) 
The contemporary Japanese female writer Matsuura Rieko 松浦理英子 seeks the 
exposed, bare body which has sensual communication with others, but also the 
subject and body that is not dichotomized such as the active and the passive. The 
body which Matsuura indicates is a bare flesh that transmits sensations, stands as it 
is, and resists by its own existence without confrontationally being against other 
bodies, in the space created between and within bodies.  
This paper investigates the concept of ma/aida, the space in-between, which is 
discussed by French author Roland Barthes as the Neutral. Since the mid-19th 
century and particularly in the postwar Japan, the relationality of Japanese self 
with the other—whether it is a nation or an individual—has been problematized, in 
the midst of the Western individualized subject and the shadowy Japanese subject. 
In particular, postwar discourse on the self has focused on the lack of a solid 
identity in the Japanese self, such as explained by the Japanese political scientist 
Maruyama Masao 丸山真男; although it was almost left out after the rise of the 
post-modern thought in the 70’ and 80’s, which prioritized the indeterminable, 
schizophrenic self rather than the modern, self-contained self. However, the fact 
that Japan did not have severe struggle with the imported ideas of the modern 
subject and individualism does not necessarily mean the lack of solid identity. In 
other words, the struggle of the indigenous principle against new foreign thought 
is not the only way to encounter others. There is another mode of encounter, and 
even resistance, through the bare self, as suggested by Barthes and Deleuze and 
Guattari, which can be further expanded using the literary creations of Matsuura. 
This paper aims to demonstrate a mode of encounter with the other, as well as with 
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the bare self, in the space created between sensual bodies, the Neutral in Barthes 
and aida in Japanese.  
This paper starts with an examination of mainly French literary theory and 
criticism which examines issues of space, the body, and the self, along with the 
literature on selfhood and space provided by Japanese psychiatrist Kimura Bin 木
村敏 who uniquely combines his clinical theorizations of Japanese cases with 
continental philosophy. Then, it examines how the discourse of contiguous 
relationships with others has functioned in modern and postwar Japan, examining 
a counterexample by Matsuura Rieko, particularly looking at the space between 
the sensual and the sexual; and the paper reflects upon (in)direct relationship in 
which the body departs to the self as well as to the other’s body, in the space 
Neutral between sensing bodies. In doing so, this paper provides a fresh view on 
the conceptions of space and indirectness between and within the body in the 
Japanese cultural context, rethinking the convention to have particularlized 
indirectness, transformation, and mediation as features of Japanese culture 
discussed through modernist authors and intellectuals, and which was criticized, 
for example, by Japanese critic Karatani Kōjin 柄谷行人 as discussed later. This 
paper aims to reconfigure the issue of in-between-ness, the space which is not 
dichotomized into periphery and centre, but can be modulated, and which 
manifests not only an adjacency to externality but also to the self.  
 
2 Creation of the Space within the Self 
Roland Barthes, in The Neutral, based on his lectures given at the Collège de 
France from 1977 to 1978, raises spacing (to create a space) as the Neutral, 
referring to the Japanese concept ma 間 (between-ness)—“spacing of time, of 
space: rules both temporality and spatiality: neither crowding nor ‘desertification’” 
(Barthes 2005, 147)—to look at the relation between moments, space and objects. 
This ma is a space, an interruption, creating indirect, mediatory to some extent, 
relations between them. Moreover, Barthes ties this spacing to the concept of the 
Neutral, quoting Maurice Blanchot:  
What is now in play, and demands relation, is everything that separates me 
from the other, that is to say the other insofar as I am infinitely separated from 
him… I found my relation with him upon this very interruption that is an 
interruption of being. This alterity, it must be repeated, makes him neither 
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another self for me, nor another existence, neither a modality or a moment of 
universal existence, nor a superexistence, a god or a non-god, but rather the 
unknown in its infinite distance. […] An alterity that holds in the name of the 
neutral. (Blanchot in Barthes 2005, 147)   
While Blanchot’s interruption here seems to mean infinite separation, the Japanese 
ma (or pronounced as aida with the same character 間) to which Barthes refers 
does not necessarily mean infinite distance, but rather a spatial and temporal 
distance which can be modulated. Yet, the Neutral does not signify the middle 
point, the “neutral,” between the two opposite poles, but rather resists being 
passive and submissive by its very existence. The point discussed in this article is 
the indirect but intimate, adjoining but weight-free, mode of communication in 
Japanese culture reflected upon literary creations, demonstrated, for example, by 
Matsuura Rieko.   
Although Japanese traditional arts such as calligraphy and tea ceremony and 
their aesthetics embrace various examples of space and rupture, paying special 
attention to empty space mainly drawn from Zen thought,1 the theorization of 
aida=ma 2  by Japanese psychopathologist Kimura Bin is suggestive. Kimura 
(1931– ) has extensively worked on schizophrenia in the Japanese socio-cultural 
context, in relation to European philosophy such as by Husserl, Heidegger, 
Derrida and Deleuze. Kimura absorbs Heidegger’s proposition of time into his 
own theorizations about the self, by reconsidering the self as “an internal 
difference with the self.” Therefore the concept of aida, which meant “the space 
between one and the other,” became internalized as “the space between the self 
and self.” (Kimura 2007, 14) Since he analyzes schizophrenia as the pathology of 
temporality, Kimura writes, “The birth of the self in ‘aida’ and the birth of time is 
strictly simultaneous,” because “if there is no action for self-realization in aida, we 
cannot have concepts of ‘next’ and ‘previous,’ ‘from now on’ and ‘until now,’ and 
cannot understand external and internal changes as temporal phenomena.” “Time 
is nothing other than an alternative name of the self.” (Kimura 2007, 47) I should 
                                                 
1 Japanese Zen scholar Fukushima Shun’ō 福嶋俊翁 writes that Zen calligraphy embraces Kū 空 
(emptiness), associated in Japanese with simplicity or a vacuum. He explains that the vacuum does 
not mean nothingness or workless-ness, since it “makes us feel the work of hand without revealing a 
hand.” The blank is in effect a tense or strained part, fulfilled, with no space left. (Fukushima 1974, 
105–106) Quotation translated by myself. 
2 Aida and ma, both represented as 間 in a Chinese character, basically convey the same meaning: 
space and time between plural objects. However, as opposed to ma, which signifies actual temporal 
or spatial rupture, aida can indicate the human relationship between the two, for which ma is not 
generally used. 
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note that the self in Kimura signifies an autonomous subject, as we can see from 
these passages. The work by Kimura is useful to employ not just because it 
extensively examines the Japanese selfhood in comparison with the European one, 
but precisely because it takes the Japanese selfhood apart and breaks down to the 
mapping of the self, time, and space, which allows us to see the relationality 
among them. As Mark Seem writes about schizoanalysis by Deleuze and Guattari 
that “schizoanalysis [against psychoanalysis which measures everything against 
neurosis and castration] begins with the schizo, his breakdowns and his 
breakthroughs” (Seem 1983, xvii). 
These concepts of “time as the self,” “the self as temporality,” and “aida 
between the self and self” are not necessarily limited to those with schizophrenia. 
Kimura divides the temporality for the schizoid and the manic as “ante-festum” 
(the ones who always address the future in the present), as opposed to the 
melancholic as “post-festum” (those who address the past in the present, based on 
the Japanese expression ato no matsuri 後の祭り, which literally means “the day 
next of the festival” but metaphorically means the feeling of “there’s nothing to do 
against what’s already happened”) (Kimura 2007, 47–51).3 Moreover, “schizo-
phrenogenic aida has a structure which imposes the young the temporality of the 
ante-festum. Therefore, those who have the basic existential structure of 
schizophrenia, regardless of whether they actually succumb to it, usually bear the 
ways of living the temporality of the ante-festum.”(Kimura 2007, 47–48) This 
means that, although those who have schizophrenogenic tendencies bear a specific 
sense of temporality that is forced by the structure, the fact that we are divided and 
interrupted by time, the temporal aida, as well as the spatial aida, seems to apply 
to our beings, including those who do not bear schizophrenic pathology. Also, 
considering the fact that humans are already involved in activities of foreseeing 
the future or reverting back to the past, which bring feelings such as of fear, 
concern, and regret, the difference seems not so much in the act itself but in the 
intensity of doing so, or the fixation to do so.  
Kimura’s idea on aida, is not only between one and the other but also between 
the self and self, taking the issue of selfhood apart and breaking down the 
mysticism of the selfhood, as discussed earlier. And this brings me to the thoughts 
on space in French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy (1940–). In Nancy, as well, the 
                                                 
3 The concepts of temporality in schizo were originally investigated in his previous book Jiko, aida, 
jikan: Genshōgakuteki seishinbyōrigaku 自己・あいだ・時間 現象学的精神病理学 (The Self, 
Between-ness, and Time: Phenomenological Psychopathology) (Kimura 1981, 122–174). 
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space is between one and the other, but also between the self and the self. Since a 
body to Nancy is not a static entity but a space to move, Nancy writes, “Bodies are 
always about to leave, on the verge of a movement, a fall, a gap, a dislocation” 
(Nancy 2008, 33). He continues: 
The body is self in departure, insofar as it parts—displaces itself right here 
from the here. The intimacy of the body exposes pure a-seity as the swerve 
and departure that it is. Aseity—the a-se(lf), the to-itself, the by-itself of the 
Subject—exists only as the swerve and departure of this a—(of this a-part-
self), which is the place, the moment proper of its presence, its authenticity, its 
sense. The a-part-self, as departure, is what’s exposed.… The a-part-self is 
not translated or incarnated into exposition, it is what it is there: this 
vertiginous withdrawal of the self from the self that is needed to open the 
infinity of that withdrawal all the way up to self. The body is this departure of 
self to self. (Nancy 2008, 32) 
The exposition here does not necessarily mean to display internal emotions or 
something hidden, since, for Nancy, the body itself is an exposition of the “self.” 
The exposition itself is the being, so that the body is “the being-exposed of the 
being” (Nancy 2008, 35). Yet, the body here is not only applied to this particular 
body since the world for Nancy is considered as the density of “(the) body(’s) 
places” (Nancy 2008, 39). Moreover, this space is not limited to aerial space but 
bears temporal dimension: 
We won’t be able to stop thinking or experiencing the fact that we destined 
ourselves to the place. But neither can we ignore the fact that history yet to 
come—because it is coming—also unravels, and challenges, destinies along 
with endings. Because it is coming, it also spaces. We will have to ponder the 
spacing of time—of time, that is, as a body.... (Nancy 2008, 41–43)  
The body displaced, the space created, is not only aerial but also temporal.  
Kimura has been deeply influenced by continental philosophy in his work, but 
it is unclear if he was directly influenced by Nancy. His works on schizophrenia 
date back to 1965. Then he started to combine them with the concept of time in 
1976, continuing to look at aida from temporal, spatial, and intra-personal aspects 
until the 1980s. During this time, he developed the theories on aida and the self as 
“an internal difference with the self,” influenced by theorists such as Deleuze and 
Derrida. However, since Nancy’s related works are mainly from the 80s, there is 
no direct reference to Nancy in the works by Kimura, at least on this topic. 
Conversely, there seems no distinctive influence of Japanese culture or theories in 
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Nancy’s works, compared to theorists such as Barthes. Therefore, there may be no 
direct influence between Kimura and Nancy, but the conceptions of space and time 
as the body or the self (thus the time, space, and the body all depart) exist in both, 
probably connected through influential intellectuals such as Derrida. 
 
3 The Passive Notion of the Self in Postwar Japan 
Reading literature on the conception of the self in Japan and continental 
philosophy side by side ostensibly raises the argument as to whether they are 
applicable to each other, or whether there is any friction in applying theories. In 
this section, I would like to analyze the discourse on the self in postwar Japan 
mainly through the work of the Japanese literary critic Karatani Kōjin. Following, 
I will apply a gender perspective to Karatani’s analysis on the subject to analyze 
how “passivity,” if any, of the subject may or may not predicate gender roles in the 
rhetoric about the self in the Japanese cultural context.  
After Japan’s defeat and surrender in 1945, various aspects of culture from 
socio-political systems, education, to literature were critically examined; postwar 
discourse such as those by political scientist Maruyama Masao 丸山真男 
criticized the absence of a solid subject in Japan and aimed for the independent 
individual. 4  When postmodern thought, which criticizes such a modern, self-
contained, determinable subjects in Europe and moves toward indeterminate, 
formless, schizophrenic subjects, was brought to Japan in the 1970s and 80s, the 
presence of the postwar discourse was rapidly degraded. Japanese intellectuals 
may have experienced a certain sense of déjà vu, since major characteristics of 
postmodern thought such as absence, nothingness, emptiness, trace, l’ecriture, and 
rupture have traditionally existed in Japanese culture. Even when I read 
postmodern theories in the twenty-first century, I find some sort of nostalgia in a 
sense that “I have encountered something similar before somewhere in my own 
                                                 
4  Maruyama especially examined the particular situation in Japan in which premodern and 
supermodern coexisted, considering the history since Japan’s opening the country in the mid-19th 
century. He differentiates “to be” in the feudal system (where the self used to be determined more by 
social class than in modernity) from “to do” in modernity (where the self is determined more by 
one’s acts), the confusion of which had been present since the mid-19th century in Japan. He argues 
that in the postwar period when the wave of social confusion and shifts, westernization, cultural 
popularization hit Japan, the confusion that preexisted in modernity exploded. Since his critique on 
Japanese modern subject essentially stems from the comparison with European subject and system 
where European people had to strive with Christian tradition, it is worthwhile to draw on 
Maruyama’s examination on the concept of postwar Japanese subject here.   
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culture,” even being aware of their structural differences. Karatani writes about 
this phenomenon, “[Japanese] people thought that we already had those things in 
Japan,” and bringing back some earlier thoughts such as by philosopher Nishida 
Kitarō 西田幾多郎, it became as if Japan was on the edge of postmodernism 
(Karatani 2002, 61). However, was that a healthy attitude towards new thoughts 
coming in?    
In his chapter analyzing the short story “Kamigami no bishō” 神神の微笑 
(“The Smile of Gods”) by Akutagawa Ryūnosuke 芥川龍之介  (1892–1927), 
written in 1922, Karatani focuses on the force to remodel (tsukurikaeru chikara 造
り変える力) in Japan. Akutagawa describes a Jesuit missionary Organtino in 16th 
century Japan who struggles with his missions for Japanese people due to their 
cultural tendency to worship Ōhirumenomuchi 大日孁貴5 as their God in Japan. 
One day, the elder explains a short history of religion and how foreign religions 
had not prevailed in Japan, and says to Organtino:  
Possibly, your God will change to an indigenous person in this country. China 
and India also changed. The West must change. We exist in trees, in a shallow 
stream, also in the wind that crosses over roses. We exist in the afterglow 
remaining on the wall of a temple. We exist anywhere, anytime. Be careful. 
Be careful…. (Akutagawa 2002, appendix 11)  
Karatani examines this “force to remodel” from various aspects, referring to the 
point above that people in Japan historically transformed foreign things, such as 
characters and religions, in a way that they fit into their own cultural context. 
Karatani’s point is that the reason why Christianity in the sixteenth century Japan 
did not flourish was due to the violence and the suppressive power by the Japanese 
government (shogunate), rather than the “force to remodel” (Karatani 2002, 85–
86). Therefore, although he appreciates Akutagawa’s sharpness, Karatani 
emphasizes that analyses of Japanese culture, including that of Akutagawa, 
conventionally have emphasized the uniqueness of its historical roots and regarded 
mere accidental past events as necessary experiences, adjoining them to its cultural 
particularity (Karatani 2002, 104). In other words, Karatani’s critique lies in the 
history of Japanese thought which enclosed their own culture by emphasizing its 
                                                 
5 =Amaterasu Ōmikami 天照大神, who is considered as a daughter of Izanagino mikoto 伊弉諾神, 
one of the creators of Japan, and who is appreciated as the Goddess of Sun in Nihon Shoki 日本書紀 
(The Chronicles of Japan). Nihon Shoki is one of the oldest books of Japanese classical history, 
finished in 720 as 30 volumes, under the editorial advice of Prince Toneri, and others.  
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uniqueness and “Japanizing” that particularity. This critique reversely verifies the 
fact that people or intellectuals in Japan used imported things in a functional way 
in their own culture which means that people modified them. Japanese people 
received other cultures as if they have accepted them, which was not necessarily 
the case.  
As is often stated even by Kimura, the Japanese self is not necessarily facing 
an absolute existence, as the traditional European subject has faced an absolute 
God in Christianity; as demonstrated in the Nihon Shoki (The Chronicles of Japan) 
and described in Akutagawa’s short story (even the title of his work demonstrates 
this), there have existed plural gods that are related to nature in Japan, prior to the 
reception of Buddhism. The self here stands towards or with nature rather than 
facing one absolute god, even as the Japanese representation of the “self” (jiko 自
己) signifies.6 Considering the fact that European people originally believed in 
plural gods in the natural world, as demonstrated in Greek Myth, what did not 
occur in Japan was potentially the integration into or replacement with an absolute 
god, and the encounter with god. Therefore the issue possibly lies more on the 
encounter rather than only on the self. Although Japanese postwar criticism, and 
even some of recent academic discourse by international scholars on Japanese 
culture, has heavily focused on the issue of Japanese selfhood and subjectivity as 
opposed to the Western one, it is how one relates to the other, while being 
conscious about the self. The dominant critique appearing in Katarani’s essay also 
mentions that Japanese people did not “encounter” others, as they were never 
invaded, forced to speak another language or to believe in foreign religions. They 
blended those foreign things with their own culture and preserved them in a 
miscellaneous place in Japan—Karatani borrows Nishida’s term “mu no basho 無
の場所 (the place of nothingness)” to describe this place—without severe struggle 
against their own solid cultural principle due to its absence. Karatani names this 
phenomenon a foreclosure of castration (Karatani 2002, 76–77).7 Therefore a solid 
                                                 
6 The Chinese character 自 signifies “naturally,” “from its own,” “from the self,” and 己 signifies 
“the self”. 自, “self” and “nature,” stem from the same character; Kimura explains that feelings and 
perceptions sensed on the body and skin in daily life are described as “self” by pulling them toward 
ourselves, and as “nature” by putting them towards the world. Therefore, he suggests the absence of 
clear-cut selfhood as well as of the otherness of nature. (Kimura 1981, 311–312) 
7 Karatani also states that, as opposed to other parts of East Asia near China where new foreign 
systems such as Chinese characters replaced the indigenous systems, Japan did and did not accept 
such characters, since they used the characters but read and pronounced in their own way. Japanese 
people participated in that linguistic world, the Symbolic, (which means castration in Lacanian 
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identity is still shadowy, which was the postwar discourse discussed above. 
However, does this analysis itself not rely on the existence of the other, waiting 
certain pressure from external others? If this is an issue of the self and encounter, 
why are the people assuming to be passively contacted by others from the outside? 
Why are they not touching others to reach out the other?  
As is well-known, Japanese author Natsume Sōseki 夏目漱石 (1867–1916) 
criticized Japanese individualism as well as the rapid industrialization and 
Westernization in the early modern period because Japanese individualism was 
caused externally under the influence of Europe, rather than caused internally, so 
that people were always anxious, wearing mere “borrowed clothes” (Natsume 
1978, 134). But Japanese postwar criticism—which emphasizes the influence of 
the lack of struggling communication with external forces on the conception of the 
self—seems to fall fundamentally into the same rhetoric Sōseki criticized: 
development due to an external force rather than an internal force. This is the 
“feminine” to be touched as opposed to the masculine to touch, in the sense of 
Emmanuel Levinas and others.8 The femininity of Japan is not only, as Japanese 
sociologist Ueno Chizuko 上野千鶴子(1948– ) states via the founder of kokugaku 
国学 (National Studies) Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長 (1730–1801), feminine in 
relation to China, but it is also femininized toward itself, in the wait of being 
touched; although we have to note that Motoori’s distinction as “feminine” is a 
modern construction. 
Ueno Chizuko, a leading scholar in Japanese Women’s Studies, problematizes 
the “feminized” Japanese mind; the Orient created through European power-
fantasy as the other to the Occident, as argued by Edward Said, is applied not only 
to the West-Japan relation, putting Japan in a passive, feminized position, but also 
to the China-Japan relation, “Japaneseness” constructed in the shadow of China 
(Ueno 2005, 225–229). Ueno writes, “Motōri adopted the strategic approach of 
cultural irony by postulating that ‘the Japanese mind’ is different from ‘Chinese 
mind’” (Ueno 2005, 227). Differentiating it from the “universal” Chinese mind, by 
which the Japanese mind has been affected and became a “component of the 
popular mind” (Ueno 2005, 227), and which is Motoori’s creation, yet still 
                                                                                                                           
sense), but did not participate at the same time, therefore foreclosed castration (Karatani 2002, 76–
77).  
8 The Beloved in Levinas, indicating the female, is explained as “…l’Aimé qui est Aimée” (Levinas 
1969, 256 footnote). Since it grammatically determines the beloved as female, feminist scholars such 
as Luce Irigaray problematized the misleading grammatical usage about gender in Levinas. 
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admitting cultural relativism, Motoori “made the Japanese mind into a residual 
category of universalism” (Ueno 2005, 228). In this construction of a residual 
category as opposed to the Occident and China, Ueno argues that the Japanese 
mind is feminized, and even more so for the female figure—doubly bound as the 
other.  
The construction of the Japanese self in the shadow of West and China 
necessarily renders the Japanese subject feminized. Therefore it could be said that, 
as Ueno suggests, the Japanese female is doubly feminized and bound. In this 
tendency, many pre- and postwar Japanese male writers have depicted female 
bodies as objects to look at, touch, and to possess, which Ueno resists. At the same 
time, there are exceptional cases since the prewar period in which female writers 
use their bodies not to be submissive but to confront males, created, for example, 
by Hirabayashi Taiko 平林たい子, where the body is radically exposed to others, 
rather than hidden in the name of preserving virginity. In the postwar period in 
which the academic endeavor driven by French feminist scholars as well as by an 
awareness of gender issues has been rapidly heightened, it is actually arguable 
whether the female body can be feminized or bound in a way that Ueno suggests. 
Furthermore, as continental philosophers such as Deleuze and Guattari show, the 
body came to be considered more fluid rather than static, mobile rather than 
permanently sedentary. Now, I would like to examine how postwar, especially 
post 80s, literature deals with issues of passivity––for the female subject to be 
touched rather than touching, and the space created between sexual and sensual, 
by examining fiction by Matsuura Rieko.  
 
4 The Non-passive Female Subject and Sensual Space demonstrated 
by Matsuura 
“I felt a new sense of longing. It wasn’t sexual desire, it was the desire to kiss Shunji,  
to ca-ress him, to be ‘friendly’ with him from head to toe.” 
––Matsuura Rieko 2009  
In a small number of her works, Matsuura Rieko (1958–) focuses on trying to 
dissolve binary thoughts such as male and female, hetero- and homosexual, and to 
seek love not limited through the union of sexual organs or “genital eros” (seikiteki 
eros 性器的エロス) in her fiction (Matsuura 1994, 75). She resists conventional 
portraits of the female body by Japanese male writers in which sensualness and 
actual physical interactions are not necessarily depicted but rather hidden; and in 
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which physical interactions such as touch tend to connote highly sexual and 
gendered meanings, dividing gender roles between men and women. Therefore, 
she writes in detail of physical relationships, of a female body which is not 
necessarily passive, and of a female subject which does not necessarily challenge 
and confront the male body, precisely because her main characters are free from 
sexual boundaries, fixations and weight and emphasis placed on the sexual organs. 
“Erotic” for her does not merely have a sexual meaning; physiological changes 
brought with psychological elevation are all erotic and sensual, such as sensations 
that are not directly connected to sexual organs, sensations where skin itches or 
blood vessels become tense, or sensations as if hearts are pressed against by wet 
hands or as if the backs of eyeballs are licked (Matsuura 1994, 74). 
Communications with others in her works are sensual or fleshly, rather than 
merely sexual. Furthermore, since her early works, sensations through touch, such 
as texture and warmth, and affects stimulated and illuminated by touch play an 
important role, regardless of whether or not the touch is between male and female, 
female and female, or human and animal or object. And boundaries between these 
relationships are not necessarily identifiable in her works. Matsuura creates a 
particular space of sensualness, which centers around the multiple memories of 
contact with others, and which demonstrates the highly sensual but sexually 
unbound, non-passive self, not by resisting but by having a dialogue with others. 
Therefore in this part, I examine the creation of the space between the sensual and 
the sexual in Matsuura where the subject (non-passive female subject) encounters 
others as well as the self, not in a confrontational manner but in a dialogue, along 
with theorizations by Deleuze and Guattari, of haptic and a bare body. And I 
would like to connect this sensual space with the temporal space through skinship 
where tactile memories traverse. 
In her work Oyayubi P no shugyō jidai 親 指 Ｐ の 修 行 時 代  (The 
Apprenticeship of Big Toe P) in 1993, which became a bestseller in Japan, the 
heterosexual female protagonist Kazumi has her big toe transformed into a penis. 
It becomes erect and feels sexual pleasure, but is passive and does not have a 
reproductive function, and therefore bears the function of a clitoris. By having a 
big toe and meeting with other members (who possess complicated sexualities) of 
the show for which she is asked to exhibit a performance of her big toe P, she 
encounters different kinds of sexuality where erotic acts are led not only by sexual 
organs but also by natural desires according to physical/physiological conditions 
and by senses through the skin, without considering sexual organs privileged. 
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Even in the latest work Kenshin 犬身 (The Dogbody) in 2007 where female 
protagonist Fusae realizes her longstanding wish to become a dog, its physical 
encounter with its female owner Azusa does not imply sexual desire. Nevertheless, 
the communication between Azusa and the dog Fusa is dominantly and purely 
tactile through touching and licking. This way, protagonists in Matsuura do not 
necessarily aim to unite with others with sexual organs in accordance with their 
sex, or communicate with others in accordance with their gender. The categorical 
relation does not exist, since the unity can be inter-sex, gender, object, and animal; 
unity meant here is not limited to “sexual” unification but is a haptic interaction. 
The term “haptic” was highlighted through the philosophical endeavour by 
Deleuze and Guattari. They questioned the divide over sense modality, for 
example, between touch and vision, particularly introducing the concepts 
“smooth” and “striated” space. Whereas smooth space is both “the object of a 
close vision par excellence and the element of a haptic space,” the striated is “a 
more distant vision, and a more optical space.” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 544) 
“The smooth always possesses a greater power of deterritorialization than the 
striated” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 530). The smooth, never being sedentary, 
keeps dislocating itself. Deterritorialization means not to invade others, not to 
possess others, as they write about the Body without Organ (BwO), “the BwO is 
never yours or mine. It is always a body.” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 182) But it 
may also mean to constantly dislocate itself, “detteritorialization” of the self, in a 
sense of departure from the self to the self, mentioned earlier through Nancy. In 
this aspect, the term “haptic” becomes meaningful to read Matsuura. “Haptic” for 
Deleuze and Guattari never dichotomizes sensual experiences; the touching as 
opposed to the touched, the seer as opposed to the seen. Sense-related terms such 
as “touch,” “see,” “look” already and necessarily connote the dichotomized 
relations. But “haptic” only implies tactile, or things related to touch, and it in-
determines who has an access to whom, precisely as Nancy problematizes 
Heidegger’s presupposition of the access to and appropriation of others in 
touching (Nancy 1997, 59–60). In sensual relationships in Matsuura, the active-
passive role is not necessarily static, betraying the readers’ expectation. 
In the early stage in The Apprenticeship, the protagonist Kazumi and his lover 
Masao possess a normative sexuality. When Kazumi’s lips and fingers move 
around Masao’s body, he says, “I feel like a woman,” “Because I’m lying here 
passively while you do what you want.” “I mean, I bet what I’m feeling right now 
is how girls feel in bed.” (Matsuura 2009, 51) However, since the fact that Kazumi 
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had a big toe P changed her idea toward sexuality, sex, and body, Kazumi cannot 
ignore these comments and says, “All right, you want my penis? You want me to 
do you?” (Matsuura 2009, 51) Having a big toe P and bearing a part of a male 
body makes Kazumi re-examine normative sexuality and body. On the other hand, 
Masao starts to have a strong sense of competition with the big toe P and asks 
Kazumi if she can insert her big toe P in her body, which she dismisses due to 
limitations of her bodily structure. Then Masao says, “Sure is a waste, though, 
considering the size of what you’ve got. It might be better for you than I am.” 
(Matsuura 2009, 54) Big toe P heightens Masao’s fixation toward sexual organ, 
from which Kazumi flees and is liberated. Their different stance toward the third 
existence big toe P creates a distance between the two. At the end of their 
relationship when both of them become irritated with each other, Masao says, 
“You’ve been getting weird on me ever since you acquired that freaky thing of 
yours” (Matsuura 2009, 61), and tries to cut it off with a cutter blade, which 
becomes the final and definitive event that determines their separation.  
Deterritorialization and the renowned notion BwO by Deleuze and Guattari—
explained “The BwO: it is already under way the moment the body has had 
enough of organs and wants to slough them off, or loses them” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004, 166)—does not necessarily mean to chop the body parts off. What 
they resist is rather organization of the body and its power which may bring value 
judgements (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 530). Dismantling it makes the body a 
bare existence, opening up a new circuit for the body. What they aim at is a bare 
body which will be left after dismantling fantasy and meaning of the body as 
organism. As opposed to the psychoanalytic body which is based on interpretation 
of the fantasy and on regression, the BwO intends to take away “the phantasy, and 
significances and subjectifications as a whole” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 168). 
BwO and deterritorialization temporally and spatially displace a body from the 
past, and let it work on the now. However, although it makes sense to read 
Matsuura next to Deleuze and Guattari through the concepts of haptic, 
deterritorialization, and BwO since they share the intension toward bareness of the 
body, the difference seems to lie in the fact that while Deleuze and Guattari aim 
toward new horizons, resisting the regression in psychoanalysis and departing 
from the past, Matsuura rather cherishes the reminiscence from the past, which 
will be explained later.   
In Matsuura’s essay Yasashii kyosei no tameni 優しい虚勢のために (For a 
Gentle Castration), there is the concept of “taking off the genital” or “undressing 
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the sexual organ” (seiki wo nugu 性器を脱ぐ) in her words. Although kyosei 虚勢
literally means castration, her castration does not signify cutting off the sexual 
organs since it is a yasashii (gentle) castration. She writes: 
Even if we strip off everything, there’s still something to take off. The reason 
why we always suffer from dissatisfactions such as the want to ride over more 
or want to embrace more may be that we wear extra clothes, something other 
than clothes. In wondering so, our face turned red.  
Then we started to take off. What? Everything extra and unclean. Maybe, 
innocent expectations, fixations, biased curiosities, possibly something that is 
naturally considered as included in love somewhere in the world. It was 
pleasant that we became weightless and our sensations became clearer.  
And, we were undressed (genitals) when we noticed. 
You undressed the (genital) which pulls over my genital from the head. 
I undressed my (genital) which arranges its form with your genital... 
In the end the (genitals) to take off are almost imaginary genitals which are 
always aware of the genitals of the opposite sex, and which wear imaginary 
genitals of the opposite sex, even if it is not during the sex act.  
It should not hurt to dispose of the (imaginary genital). 
This castration is a gentle one. 
In your and my body after castration, the genital remains as a simple organ. 
The quiet genital is not an eyesore. It does not have a special value; it does not 
speak for anyone, or symbolize or suggest anything. Maybe it does not even 
indicate sexual difference. You and I have quitted (expression) through 
genitals. (Matsuura 1994, 235–238)       
Her character is freed from what it should or must be, and can enjoy what it can be, 
by removing the genital rather than by castrating it. Thus, her protagonist, freed 
from the extra weight of genitals, is always free, “almost to be about to fly in the 
air” (Matsuura 1991, 205).      
However, in the freedom which her protagonists (or in the case of The 
Apprenticeship, Kazumi’s lover Shunji as well) often possess, there is a certain 
reminiscence of childhood. In the beauty that Matsuura describes about someone, 
there is the purity, cleanliness, and sweetness of a child, possessing “the 
sensualness of a child to which one instinctively feels like giving a hand” 
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(Matsuura 1994, 80). Even in Kenshin, Fusae says, “Maybe I haven’t developed as 
a human being” (Matsuura 2007, 82–83), when she ponders upon “dog sexuality” 
where one “feels like being in heaven as long as one is fondled by one’s favourite 
human as a human fondles a dog” (Matsuura 2007, 82), which is a very basic type 
of pleasure.   
BwO by Deleuze and Guattari works upon the now, so that it is always about 
experiment rather than regression, departing from the past. Meanwhile, although 
Matsuura’s “taking off the genital” also disposes fantasy, fixation, and meaning of 
the imaginary genital as BwO dismantles significances, it does not take the past 
memory out. In The Apprenticeship, Shunji, the lover, tells Kazumi about his 
memory of being hugged by his uncle:  
“My uncle was sitting in the same room, not moving, maybe reading, and then 
suddenly he got up and came over to where I was. I was rolling around and 
bumped into his leg, which sort of surprised me, so I stayed still. Then he bent 
down, put his arm around me sort of hesitantly, and hugged me. I remember 
feeling how big his bones were.” Shunji wrapped his own arms around his 
body. “It made me real happy. No one ever hugged me that way again.” 
(Matsuura 2009, 115)      
Since, especially for Shunji, touch is a way to communicate love, not limited to the 
sexual sense, and to show natural affection toward others, there is not much 
difference for him between touch for adults and that which takes place in 
childhood. Since the BwO is a becoming, it is “the opposite of a childhood 
memory” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 182). Yet, the point is that this opposition 
does not mean to disavow the childhood memory but rather to disavow the 
temporal one-way linearity toward the past as in psychoanalysis. “It is not the 
child ‘before’ the adults, or the mother ‘before’ the child: it is the strict 
contemporaneousness of the adult, of the adult and the child, their map of 
comparative densities and intensities, and all of the variations on that map.” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 182) Therefore, in Deleuze and Guattari as well, 
although they resist set significations, they don’t necessarily disavow the past in a 
strict sense; Deleuze and Guattari bring the past into the contemporaneity so that 
one quits reflecting the past in a deterministic manner. And yet, because it is 
“taking off the genital” in the case of Matsuura, it is not impossible to wear it 
again, attaching or detaching it. Thus, it is not a definitive castration but rather a 
“gentle” castration.     
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Encounter and touch in Matsuura are highly sexual, but not always and not 
exclusively. Touch here is more that of a soothing skinship9 that brings dislocated 
memory of touch even from childhood, rather than a merely erotic relationship; 
skinship starts with a person’s birth and lasts until death, accumulating layered 
memories of touch: those with parents, friends, lovers, loved objects, among others. 
Matsuura’s loved characters often bear some sort of childishness and make us 
remember the memory of touch in our childhood, something that is maybe 
underdeveloped, that is simple, but something that is remembered within our 
bodies throughout life. And soothing physical sensations and affection that have 
been experienced through the skin have wished repeatedly to renew or re-
experience the memorably soothing moments. Therefore, contrary to the tendency 
in Japanese literature regarding touch as an erotic touch amongst adults, touch 
exists throughout life. And yet, as Deleuze and Guattari do not necessarily set a 
clear distinction between the adult and the child, fleshly experience in Matsuura is 
always sensual, entailing the possibility to develop toward sexual pleasure in 
adults.  
Now, we notice that touch for Matsuura is not passive. Since The 
Apprenticeship is, simply speaking, the story of Kazumi’s development, she waits 
to have her clothes taken off and to be touched by her earlier lover Masao in the 
beginning. But it changes by having her big toe P and encountering others with 
unique sexualities. Especially through the communication with Shunji, Kazumi 
starts to wish to embrace, touch, and soothe Shunji herself. Kazumi dissolves her 
fixation with her sexual organ by having a big toe P and becomes freed from the 
female gender role which implies being touched rather than touching. The 
childishness mentioned above is not to be a child or to regress, but to grow while 
maintaining a state of childishness, knowing sexual excitation, fixation with 
genitals, and its dissolution. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Reconsidering the space between the self and self, between the sexual and sensual, 
the rhetoric mentioned earlier that the sharp structure of the self as opposed to the 
objective other was not created in Japan due to the lack of serious friction between 
                                                 
9  The term skinship is a Japanese English word created in Japan, meaning the intimate 
communication through touch such as between the mother and child. 
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the two, refers to the relation between the self as the subject and the other as the 
object, if we borrow Kimura’s framework. The point is that the gap created in the 
postwar rhetoric on the self is a gap between one and the other, not between one as 
the subject and the other as the subject but the other as the object, so that the space 
cannot play a role of aida where they both meet. “Only the relation between the 
subject [of the self] and the subject [of the other] can open an aida that is mutually 
subjective, and only by its participation in aida can the subject totally be the 
subject” (Kimura 2007, 128). Although critique such as by Maruyama is 
prominent, postwar rhetoric, in a way, created a distance with the other on the far 
side of the shore, which may be applied also to the Western context. However, this 
space is not static but should be mobile as Nancy suggests, and has a temporal 
dimension. Aida is a space where we can modulate the relation to others and to the 
self, to be a bare body. It is a space where one touches the other as well as oneself, 
and where those memories of touch traverse.  
The body becomes further weightless and further mobile, untied from genitals 
by “taking off” the genital and freed from dichotomized relation by becoming a 
bare body. The Neutral which Barthes explored is not to situate oneself in between 
black and white, radical and conservative, or progressive and regressive. But 
rather the body is freed from such a dichotomy by being a bare body. And it resists 
through its very existence, even without saying a word. As referred to earlier, 
Nancy’s body, or rather body-place, is “acephalic and aphallic” and a variously 
folded “skin” (Nancy 2008, 15). The “direct” physical relationship probably used 
to mean the unification of sexual organs, or at least the intended genital unification 
as the peak of physical and emotional exchange; “indirect,” as opposed to “direct,” 
would mean unification through something other than genitals. However, 
Matsuura, from the collection of her works, shows that direct physical relationship 
is not necessarily the genital relationship but also skinship. Even skinship, as non-
genital-focused relationship, creates a sensual space, a space for different trials of 
touch. This space, aida, is the space between one and the other, but also one to one 
as referred to both in Nancy and Kimura earlier. In Kimura’s theorizations about 
interpersonal communication, the simple structure of the encounter between the 
self as the subject and the other as the object is not formed; rather, the self as the 
subject encounters the other as the subject. The space aida in this sense does not 
mediate relations; or in other words, it does not prevent direct communication. The 
sensual experience is not to possess and swallow the other, but to excite, soothe, 
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touch the other as well as the self, by touching together. And in this sense, the 
body is always leaving toward the sensual Neutral space.  
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